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How Pervasive is the US Public Shift on Israel?

How Pervasive is the US Public Shift on Israel?

Dr. Shibley Telhami—the Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland and an influential scholar on foreign affairs and American public opinion on the Middle East—presented a sweeping historical picture yesterday of how American attitudes toward Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have evolved in recent decades.

“What we’re witnessing is a paradigmatic shift that’s likely to last that sees Israel as a villain and perhaps even a genocidal villain,” Telhami said in a seminar presented to the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research. “We have something that I think is more than just a short-term shift in public opinion, and that is much deeper than people may assume.”

Telhami’s central argument, based on his work polling American attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 1989, is that Americans’ support for Israel– waning gradually over the past 15 years– experienced a dramatic crash following the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas attack and the Israeli assault on Gaza. Telhami: “The dam finally broke in Gaza once the scale of the Israeli assault became clear.”

A Paradigm Shift

Gallop Poll: In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with the Israelis or the Palestinians? The longitudinal data that excludes "both" or "neither" responses shows sympathies have leaned significantly in favor of Israel until 2023, with the largest gap in 1991. The gap narrows gradually until recent years, when the trends make a rapid reversal, with 41% most recently leaning toward Palestians compared to 36% toward Israelis.

Telhami emphasized that this transformation did not begin with the war in Gaza, but was building over time. Telhami’s polling data of past decades showed that a majority of Americans have consistently said they want the U.S. to take “neither side” in the conflict. Among the minority who did express a preference, support for Israel outweighed support for the Palestinians by wide margins—often five or six to one. Telhami has seen that gap close over time, with fewer Americans choosing “neither side,” and among those who do take sides, a narrowing—and eventually reversing—preference, especially among Democrats.

It was a shift Telhami tracked and anticipated. In 2014, Telhami published an op ed in Foreign Policy entitled “America Has a Plan, and No, It Isn’t One That Israel Would Like,” and in 2015, his widely cited Monkey Cage blog for the Washington Post, “How to (almost) eliminate the partisan divide on the Middle East,” explored the widening partisan gap between Republicans and Democrats regarding Israel-Palestine. The divide was largely driven by evangelical Christians, and fanned by Netanyahu’s criticism, before Congress, of Obama’s Iran nuclear deal.

Under Biden, Telhami’s University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll confirmed that half of young Democrats (under 35) disapproved of the new U.S. president’s handling of the May 2021 Gaza conflict. Writing for the Brookings Institution, Telhami argued that the data underscored a generational shift that would prove to be a warning sign of a widening fracture within the Democratic coalition, and anticipated that could impact Biden’s reelection.

Telhami’s polling data showed an initial, dramatic spike in sympathy for Israel in the immediate aftermath of the October 7, 2023 attacks—the largest poll-to-poll increase he has measured in decades of surveying. But this reversed within roughly two weeks, even before the full scope of Israel’s military actions was apparent. Young Democrats did not shift in attitudes during this initial spike– and as the war intensified, their sympathies moved decisively toward the Palestinians.

Telhami used Gallup Poll data to illustrate the scale of the overall reversal: Sympathy for Israel among all Americans fell from roughly 50% to 36%, while sympathy for Palestinians rose to 41%. Among Democrats specifically, the shift was described as “stunning”—support for Israel plummeted from over 50% in 2001 to roughly 17% in recent polling, while sympathy for Palestinians rose to 65%. Republican attitudes, by contrast, remained largely stable or even slightly strengthened in favor of Israel—with one critical exception.

A Generational Gap in Both Parties

Telhami’s data show a narrowing generational gap among Democrats and growing gap among Republicans. 

Pew polling cited by Telhami showed that among Democrats, the gap between younger and older cohorts on unfavorable views of Israel has nearly disappeared (71% vs. 66%). Between 2022 and 2025, younger and older Democrats turned more negative toward Israel, but negative views among younger Democrats grew by 9 percent, compared with a 23-point increase among older Democrats.

Even more notable is movement among younger Republicans: Unfavorable views of Israel in this group rose from 35% to 57% in a short span—a shift Telhami called evidence that this is “spreading to more segments of society,” not confined to the political left.

Telhami’s research on evangelicals demonstrated that younger evangelicals, unlike their elders, were “walking away” from unconditional support for Israel.

When asked whether Israel’s actions in Gaza were “justified” as self-defense, only 22% of young Republicans responding to Telhami’s poll agreed, compared to 52% of older Republicans.

Why Now? Drivers of the Shift

Telhami outlined several interlocking explanations for why this issue has moved from the margins to the center of American political consciousness:

  1. Rising priority for those attuned to the issue: Drawing on decades-old research with colleague Jon Krosnick, Telhami explained that policy influence depends less on broad public opinion than on “issue publics”—segments who rank an issue as a top priority. Historically, this issue public was small but overwhelmingly pro-Israel. Now, younger Democrats increasingly rank Israel-Palestine as a high concern, possibly because they view it as emblematic of broader commitments to human rights and democracy.
  2. Perceptions of genocide and American complicity: Telhami’s polling shows substantial and growing numbers of Americans—including a plurality of the general public and majorities of Democrats—describing Israel’s actions in Gaza as “genocide” or “major war crimes akin to genocide.” More than 60% of respondents said U.S. military and diplomatic support actively enabled these actions, tying the issue directly to American foreign policy rather than treating it as a distant humanitarian concern.
  3. The Iran War as an accelerant: Telhami argued that the U.S. strike on Iran transformed the issue from a foreign policy question into what he called a “pocketbook issue,” linked tangibly to energy prices and inflation. Public discourse increasingly framed the war as one the U.S. entered on behalf of Israel and Netanyahu.
  4. A “permission structure” for criticism: Telhami theorized that a social and psychological threshold had been crossed: Once enough people began publicly criticizing Israel, others who privately held similar views felt emboldened to speak out, having previously assumed they were in the minority. Telhami’s polling of the public and of scholars of political science has directly asked whether and why Americans have self-censored in sharing their views on Israel-Palestine. Pre-war, more than 60% of scholars reported feeling the need to self-censor when discussing Israel-Palestine professionally, with the overwhelming majority citing fear of appearing critical of Israel. That figure rose above 80% after October 7. Extending this research to the general public, Telhami found that 42% of Americans say they feel the need to be “careful” discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in public—compared to only 29% who say the same about Russia-Ukraine.

Looking Ahead: Fragility, Wild Cards, and Electoral Consequences

Telhami closed with reflections on the durability of this shift and its political stakes:

  • Israeli elections: While some observers hope a new Israeli government might ease American concerns, polling data suggests dissatisfaction with Israel runs deeper than opposition to Netanyahu personally.
  • Islamophobia as a “wild card”: Telhami highlighted dramatically rising unfavorable views of Muslims among Republicans—now at a 12-year high—which could continue to anchor pro-Israel sentiment within the GOP even as other factors erode it.
  • Trump and Republican fragility: Telhami argued that Republican support for Israel is more fragile than commonly assumed, and that anchoring this support in this moment is is President Trump’s personal backing of Israel. A political shift in course from the GOP might not result in major backlash from the evangelical base that supports Trump for reasons unrelated to Israel.
  • Electoral consequences: Telhami argued that the Israel-Palestine issue contributed to Democratic losses in 2024, including Kamala Harris’s defeat, citing both polling data and firsthand knowledge of internal campaign dynamics. He suggested the upcoming midterms will reveal how durable this electoral effect proves to be, with races like those in Texas potentially offering more revealing tests than reliably Democratic states like Michigan.

While acknowledging uncertainty about how this shift will translate into concrete policy outcomes that are never purely a function of public opinion, Telhami asserted: “Public opinion will matter more on this issue than it has in the past. I have no doubt about that.”

This post was written by Tevah Platt, who manages communications for the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research. It is based on Telhami’s presentation on Oct. 14, 2026 in the CPS Interdisciplinary Workshop on Politics and Policy. 

Learn more: Telhami’s newly released 2026 Critical Issues Poll data tracks prejudice toward Jews and Muslims among the American public, and also measures change in how Americans define antisemitism and the extent to which they differentiate attitudes against Jews and Judaism from attitudes against Israel and Zionism.

What are the Implications of the 2026 Brazil Election?

What are the Implications of the 2026 Brazil Election?

Português

On Oct. 4, over 100 million Brazilians headed to the polls to elect a president, state governors, two-thirds of the Senate, federal and state deputies and, in the Federal District, district deputies.  The top two presidential candidates, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and former President Jair Bolsonaro, will go to a run-off election on Oct. 25. The new leader will take power on Jan. 5, 2027. Fernanda Pires of Michigan News sat down with University of Michigan experts Edgar Franco-Vivanco and Raphael Nishimura on the eve of the first-round election that ended in a 47-45% split between Bolsonaro and Lula. Her Q&A follow:

The election is taking shape amid divisions over President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and the political legacy of former President Jair Bolsonaro. Bolsonaro’s son, Flávio Bolsonaro, is Lula’s main rival in the presidential race. Voters’ concerns about the economy, public security, the Supreme Court crisis and the country’s future are also central to the race.

University of Michigan assistant professor of political science Edgar Franco-Vivanco, director of the Latin American Elections Hub, and Raphael Nishimura, sampling operations director at the Institute for Social Research, discuss voter sentiment, polling and the election’s potential implications for Latin America and the world.

What could Brazil’s election mean for the region and the world?

Franco-Vivanco: Latin America has shown a clear political shift to the right. Four countries in the region—Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru—have recently moved toward right-wing governments. In Brazil, voters are disappointed with previous left-leaning incumbents and increasingly frustrated by rising crime and persistent corruption scandals. As Latin America’s largest democracy, Brazil will determine whether the region’s rightward shift gains momentum or faces a major counterweight.

The election holds major stakes for domestic life and the regional balance of power. A rightward turn would leave Mexico as the only major regional democracy outside this trend.

For international powers such as the United States and China, the outcome will determine how the next government balances crucial trade relationships and foreign influence. Domestically, everyday life hinges on how the incoming administration addresses public security, economic performance and persistent corruption.

This major election in Brazil will test the strength and stability of the region’s democratic institutions. Smaller Latin American nations are closely monitoring the outcome as they consider how to align their regional policies with the region’s leading power.

Brazil must balance its primary economic relationship with China with heavy diplomatic pressure from the United States. A close final vote raises the risk of postelection conflict and increases pressure on candidates to respect democratic norms by accepting the official results.

Right-wing candidates are capitalizing on public security concerns by making crime reduction their primary focus. Meanwhile, many voters remain deeply apathetic and disappointed with democracy because candidates have failed to address these issues directly.

How do voters split across key demographics in this race?

Franco-Vivanco: Gender is a primary dividing line in voter support, according to previous research. Women have traditionally backed Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, while men have tended to support Jair Bolsonaro and right-wing parties.

Recent polling shows this gender gap narrowing as candidates’ campaigns seek to alter those trends. Meanwhile, young voters are exhibiting shifting political behavior. Unlike in previous election cycles, when young voters aligned closely with left-wing causes, current polling indicates a more divided electorate among younger voters.

What post-election challenge threatens the stability of the result?

Franco-Vivanco: The core danger is whether the losing candidate accepts the final result without conflict. A tight margin increases the likelihood of postelection disputes, particularly if Flávio Bolsonaro suffers a narrow defeat. Experts view candidates’ adherence to democratic norms as the primary test for maintaining peace after voters cast their ballots.

How do foreign trade and international relations shape the stakes of this election?

Franco-Vivanco: Foreign relations depend heavily on how the incoming leader balances major global economic powers. China remains Brazil’s primary trading partner, making strong economic ties essential to the nation’s financial stability.

At the same time, the government faces direct geopolitical pressure from the United States, which prefers a closely aligned administration in the region. Maintaining this delicate balance between Washington and Beijing presents a complex diplomatic test for any administration. Smaller Latin American nations are closely following the outcome as they consider how to align their foreign policies with regional leadership.

Now, let’s talk about polls. What insights can we expect from the final eight presidential polls scheduled for release on Saturday, the day before Brazil’s election?

Nishimura: We will have polls of various sizes and methodologies, so each will look at the same question from a different angle. We can expect some of them to disagree, but, on average, they will present a snapshot of the Brazilian electorate moments before voters go to the polls.

Do the final polls tend to provide a more accurate picture of voter intentions, or can last-minute changes still significantly affect the results?

Nishimura: While the final polls might provide a closer look at what voters are thinking as the election approaches, we should not expect them to necessarily reflect the election results. Factors such as turnout, last-minute decisions and strategic voting might alter the snapshot taken days or even hours before the election.

What should voters look for when comparing the findings of different organizations?

Nishimura: Different methodologies might lead to different results. Polling methodology involves many aspects, from sample and questionnaire design to postdata-collection statistical adjustments. One of the main drivers, however, is the mode of data collection—whether in person, by phone or online.

This will most likely account for the main differences in the results. Also, in Brazil, all publicly released election polls must be registered with the Superior Electoral Court. Anyone can consult the court’s system to review the methods used in each poll.

What are the biggest methodological challenges in accurately measuring voter intentions in Brazil’s presidential race?

Nishimura: Although voting is mandatory in Brazil, one of the main methodological challenges for pollsters is measuring turnout, especially because nonparticipation is not random and affects candidates differently. This challenge is aggravated by the fact that, as in the United States and other countries, voters tend to overreport turnout in polls.

Moreover, Brazil does not have a database—such as the voter file in the United States—that contains each voter’s turnout history and could enable pollsters to estimate likely-voter models. The lack of such a list, coupled with the country’s continental size, also makes it very difficult to collect data efficiently without relying on telephone sampling. Telephone sampling has its own problems, as fewer people answer calls because of telemarketing and scams.

Edgar Franco-Vivanco is an affiliate of the Center for Political Studies, and Raphael Nishimura is an affiliate of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research.

Solar-Powered Clean Water Reaches Rural Tanzania Through University of Michigan Partnership

Solar-Powered Clean Water Reaches Rural Tanzania Through University of Michigan Partnership

Bold Challenges Initiative team celebrates milestone as villages gain access to clean water

After two years of collaborative effort, a team of University of Michigan researchers is celebrating a major milestone in rural Tanzania: Clean, safe water now flows to Esilalei and Oltukai villages and surrounding hamlets in Monduli District, serving pastoralist families who formerly traveled long distances in search of water. 

The project is expected to benefit more than 10,000 people, local health clinics, a primary school, and countless livestock, using solar power to pump and distribute water to Maasai communities. It’s a model of sustainable technology meeting the urgent global need to address water scarcity.

The Bold Challenges team stands in a rural village in front of a traditional round, thatched-roof homestead

Sisty Massawe, Brian Min, Kelly Askew and Aline Cotel in Oltukai Village, October 11, 2024

The initiative was led by University of Michigan researchers Brian Min, associate professor of political science; Kelly Askew, Niara Sudarkasa Collegiate Professor of Anthropology and Afroamerican and African Studies; Aline Cotel, Arthur F. Thurnau Professor and associate professor of civil and environmental engineering, and Sisty Basil Massawe, executive director of the ELICO Foundation in Tanzania and a former fellow of the University of Michigan African Presidential Scholars (UMAPS) program. Min and Askew are affiliates of the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research. 

From Solar Panels to Water ATMs

Villagers encircle a water faucet dispensing water into an orange utility jug

Water ATM dispensing water in Kanjiro hamlet, Esilalei Village, July 17, 2026

Through support from the University of Michigan and its Bold Challenges Initiative, ELICO Foundation installed a solar-powered pumping system in Esilalei Village, expanded the water distribution network, and introduced a prepaid water management system—delivered through “Water ATMs,” automated machines to dispense water from a natural spring about 12 miles away to ensure reliable and sustainable delivery. 

“The solar-powered infrastructure eliminates dependence on fossil fuels or unreliable grid electricity to meet the realities of remote pastoral communities,” said Askew.

The team then focused on extending clean water services to Oltukai Village by connecting it to the Minjingu water supply system of the neighboring Babati District.  

On July 26, the day the researchers returned from their field visits,  the pipeline they helped construct with local partners ELICO Foundation and the district rural water authority (RUWASA) reached Oltukai Village. 

Interdisciplinary Collaboration

The project exemplifies the Bold Challenges Initiative’s mission to support interdisciplinary teams pursuing solutions to real-world problems with potential for large-scale impact. Solutions implemented in local communities can be tested and later applied on a global scale. Selected for the 2024 Boost cohort under the title “Solar PV Water Pumping for Domestic and Livestock Uses in Last Mile Pastoral Societies in Tanzania,” the team bridges political science, anthropology, and engineering with deep local knowledge and partnerships.

The researchers bring a wide range of expertise to the community-driven initiative. Min’s research uses satellite imagery and computational methods to track energy access and reliability across the developing world: Work that has revealed the true scale of global energy poverty and the equity gaps that persist in underserved regions. Askew has conducted research in Tanzania for more than three decades, with expertise spanning land rights, rural energy access, cultural production, and Indigenous political movements. Cotel brings engineering expertise in water systems and a commitment to creating pathways for women in science and engineering.

The project is an example of the University of Michigan’s leadership in energy, climate action, sustainability, and environmental equity, bringing solutions to communities disproportionately affected.

For Maasai pastoralist families, the consequences of inadequate access to clean water include conflict over scarce resources, decimated livestock herds, forced displacement, and public health risks.  

Two workers wheel a wound circle of pipeline taller than themselves up to a long narrow trench dug for installation

Digging the trench and preparing material for the water pipeline to Oltukai Village, July 18, 2026

The team celebrated the arrival of clean water to the Masaai communities at the end of July and  will be installing ‘Water ATMs’ over the coming month to expand water access in Oltukai Village, with locations that include a health clinic and a cattle trough. 

Team members pose in front of a framed sign that reads, "Bold Challenge: Solar PV Water Pumping for Domestic and Livestock Uses in Last Mile Pastoral Societies in Tanzania, with partner logos

Left to right: Kelly Askew, Brian Min, Aline Cotel, Sisty Massawe, Monduli District Water Engineer Neville Msaki, John Maxwell (ReCon Corp, Michigan), July 17, 2026

This post was written by Tevah Platt, communications manager for the Center for Political Studies. Photography by Esau Ng’umbi of the ELICO Foundation.

Orbán’s overwhelming defeat is a huge victory for Hungary, Europe and the United States

Orbán’s overwhelming defeat is a huge victory for Hungary, Europe and the United States

Victor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary for sixteen years (2010-26), has conceded the election to Peter Magyar and his opposition Tisza party. This is an enormous defeat for the right-wing populist leader and his right-wing populist Fidesz party and a landslide victory for the democratic opposition.

Parliamentary Supermajority for the Opposition Provides Lever to Rebuild Democracy

By winning more than 135 seats in the 199-seat legislative body, Magyar’s Tisza party has not just secured a majority but a supermajority in the Hungarian parliament. Orbán’s Fidesz party has held a parliamentary supermajority for four consecutive terms, which he has used to rewrite the constitution to consolidate his own power and to undermine democracy and the rule of law in Hungary. 

Many of the tactics he used are part of the authoritarian playbook that is by now all too familiar—eliminating checks and balances on executive authority, taking control over media outlets, and reengineering the electoral system to disadvantage the opposition. Regaining control will enable the opposition to amend the constitution, reverse many of these changes, and rebuild institutions that promote democracy and the rule of law. 

Yet, the landslide victory is not only a triumph for Hungary’s democratic opposition and the country’s future trajectory; it is also a major win for Europe, the European Union (EU), Ukraine, and the US. 

Hope for a Strong and United Europe 

The defeat of Orbán and his nationalist agenda signals to Europe, and to Europeans, that the rise of right-wing populism is not irreversible. Although not yet the dominant trend across the continent, far-right parties such as Orbán’s Fidesz have been gaining ground in Europe since the 2000s and appeared to be building momentum. Moreover, Orbán himself has become an iconic figure among them, exemplifying the success of illiberal democracy. The sweeping electoral victory of the liberal opposition in Hungary has countered this trend and diminished Orbán’s appeal as a model for Europe’s future. Instead, he is a cautionary tale. 

Second, Orban’s defeat signals that Hungarians have not rejected either Europe or European values, including liberal democracy. As many European leaders stated following the election results, there is renewed hope for a strong and united Europe. 

The primary beneficiary of this reunion—at least in the short run—is Ukraine. Among the many ways in which Orbán has undermined the EU is his refusal to support either further assistance to Ukraine or stricter sanctions against Russia following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. As part of his electoral campaign, Magyar pledged to rebuild Hungary’s relationship with the EU. He made good on this promise following his victory by agreeing to unblock critical aid in the form of a 90-billion-euro ($103-billion) loan to Ukraine. 

Takeaways for the US

The cautionary tale of Orbán’s defeat also suggests a prescriptive one for the United States. Both the large turnout and the substantial margins made the Tisza party’s electoral win too decisive for even Orbán to contest. But neither the size of the turnout nor the landslide victory happened overnight. Albeit weakened by Orban’s policies, Hungarian civil society continued to mobilize undaunted, and Hungarian citizens increasingly took to the streets to show Orban, his loyalists, and most importantly, their fellow citizens that they would not tolerate an autocratic takeover. 

The road ahead will be difficult. Orbán not only succeeded in dismantling democratic institutions and the rule of law. He also used his unchecked authority to institute a system of crony capitalism, rewarding loyalists with control over key economic sectors and lucrative development contracts, and destroying Hungary’s economy in the process. In fact, the protests that amalgamated in the opposition’s massive victory focused on anti-corruption and pocket-book issues. So too did Magyar’s electoral campaign, signifying that this is a winning electoral strategy. The new government will have to both rebuild and restore confidence in democratic institutions and the rule of law while actively combating the corrupt practices that have fueled inflation and slowed economic recovery.  

Pauline Jones

This post was written by Pauline Jones, Research Professor and Director of the University of Michigan Center for Political Studies. Pauline Jones is a Professor of Political Science and the Edie N. Goldenberg Endowed Director for the Michigan in Washington Program. She is an expert on politics in the former Soviet Union (including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia) and on assessing the impact of mass protest in authoritarian regimes. She regularly teaches PoliSci140: Introduction to Comparative Politics and recently shared her insights on US democratic decline in global perspective. Dr. Jones is currently a fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (CASBS) at Stanford University.

American Stereotypes about Jewish, Muslim, and Black Americans: Preliminary Evidence from a 2024 US Survey

American Stereotypes about Jewish, Muslim, and Black Americans: Preliminary Evidence from a 2024 US Survey

A new survey on the nature and distribution of American stereotypes about Jewish, Muslim, and Black Americans measures the nature, extent and distribution of stereotypes about each of the three groups.

The broad goals of the survey and analyses of the data are:

  • to map the dimensional structure of prevailing stereotypes about each group
  • to map the distribution of these stereotypes across important population categories
  • to explore the relationships between stereotypes of different religious or ethnic groups,
  • to test hypotheses about probable determinants of various stereotypes

The survey was designed and carried out by Mark Tessler and Francy Luna Diaz of the University of Michigan and Amnon Cavari, associate professor of Political Science at Reichman University in Israel.

A research brief including preliminary results from the survey reports findings on some of the negative stereotypes about each group that the survey examined. Results on additional questions, including positive stereotypes and questions about US foreign policy and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, will be forthcoming.

The brief focuses on the degree of agreement with two negative stereotypes about Jewish, Muslim, and Black Americans, respectively, which is not the same for the three groups; how responses pertaining to stereotypes are associated with differing levels of education, and how agreement with stereotypes across groups are correlated.

Read the Research Brief: Some Preliminary and Partial Findings on American Stereotypes about Jewish, Muslim, and Black Americans: Evidence from a 2024 US Survey

The Research Brief was published by the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research.

‘On the Roof of Himmler’s Guesthouse’ – The Untold Story of a German Refugee Turned US Soldier

‘On the Roof of Himmler’s Guesthouse’ – The Untold Story of a German Refugee Turned US Soldier

A Special Exhibit opens June 19 in Berlin 

This year marks the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, and at a moment when global authoritarianism is on the rise, a tiny fraction of the people with memories of the war and Hitler’s Europe are alive today to relay their stories. It is increasingly the work of archivists and descendants to transmit the record of that time– to honor and reckon with the past, and to invoke what Elie Wiesel called “a prayer, a promise and a vow”: Never again.

A special exhibition opening June 19 at the House of the Wannsee (VAN-see) Conference Memorial and Educational Site on the outskirts of Berlin centers on the story of Fritz Traugott, a German Jewish refugee expelled from his native Hamburg, who returned to Europe as an American soldier.

Traugott was among some 10,000 “Ritchie Boys” in the U.S. Army– soldiers trained in intelligence gathering who graduated from Camp Ritchie, Maryland– and one of the 20 percent of that force who were Jewish refugees with language skills that were leveraged in the effort. 

His letters to his wife at home in Providence, R.I., and photos he took at the Wannsee villa in the summer of 1945 are at the heart of the special exhibit that tells Traugott’s story but is as much about memory itself.

“In my mind, it’s not really a story about my father,” said Michael Traugott, who shared his father’s documents with Wannsee after discovering them in 2018. “I think he is kind of a vessel in this story for thinking about the 80th anniversary of the end of the war, and about what happened then, and how it relates to what’s going on now, and other events in between.”

A Portrait of Fritz Traugott

The youngest of three children, Fritz Julius Traugott was born in Hamburg in 1919. After the passage of Nuremberg Laws that sought to marginalize and separate Jews in German society in 1935, he was forced to leave the Lichtwark School, a prominent high school that emphasized cultural education and the fine arts. He remained in close contact with his classmates and his teacher, Erna Stahl, an influential educator who once characterized her own work as creating an “inner counterbalance” in her students to the “destructive, demonic denial of all human spiritual worth, especially in Germany, which could not be undone.”

Class photo

A 1933/34 class photo of the Lichtwark School from the Traugott archive. Both in the back row, Fritz Traugott is third from the left, and Erna Stahl, fourth from the right. Six of the students in the photo are wearing Hitler Youth uniforms.

With professional opportunities likewise cut off, Traugott followed his brother in immigrating to the United States in 1938, and his parents followed. Traugott’s sister, Hedwig, remained in Hamburg with her non-Jewish husband and two daughters, surviving through Nazi persecution, forced labor, and the bombing of their home. 

Traugott married Lucia Scola, an Italian-American Catholic, in Providence. 

At 22, he was drafted into the U.S. Army, where he was transferred to Camp Ritchie to learn counter-intelligence and interrogation techniques. He was first deployed to England to participate in the “secret listeners” program, an operation that helped record details using bugging devices to pick up conversations among German military leaders. They collected important intelligence information to help the war effort, including the location of the facility where V2 rockets were being built. 

Traugott was sent to France where with his unit, Mobile Field Interrogation Unit #2, he later traveled behind American troops moving into Germany, interviewing prisoners of war. He was at the Battle of the Bulge, not as a combatant, but working feverishly to collect intelligence from German prisoners. And just after Germany’s surrender, he was billeted at the Wannsee villa from July to September 1945. His unit was housed at the former SS guesthouse that– although his unit may not have been initially aware of it– had been the site of a pivotal Nazi summit a few years prior to plan “the final solution.” 

The Summer of 1945

Traugott spent more than two months at the Wannsee villa, a site referred to as “Himmler’s guesthouse,” during this early post-war period. He bought a camera in Berlin and sent pictures and daily letters to his wife in Providence, often on “souvenir” stationery from “the Führer’s adjutant’s office” he had found in the Reich Chancellery. 

A drawing of soldiers in front of the Wannsee villa

Based on the photos taken by Fritz Traugott, this artist rendering of the Ritchie Boys at the Wannsee villa was created for the museum by Mathis Eckelmann. Courtesy of the Wannsee Conference Memorial and Educational Site.

The photos and letters, now on display as part of the special exhibit at Wannsee, include snapshots of soldiers and prisoners of war at Wannsee, the nearby interrogation center, and the ruins of his former home he took on a visit to Hamburg.

His letters communicate his affection for Lucia and infant son, Michael, born in his absence. One personal account to his wife, written on pilfered Nazi letterhead on Aug. 10, 1945, describes how the normalization of persecution made it difficult to communicate and for outsiders to understand it:

You see sweetheart, when you live in danger, or misery, or any other extreme state, you kinda get used to it, or at least it loses most of the effect it has on outsiders.

Handwritten letter on Nazi stationary

From the Traugott archive, a letter home on the pilfered stationary of the “Adjutantur Des Führers,” August 10, 1945.

Traugott took two short visits to Hamburg to see his sister and the city he fled in 1938. On his second visit, his sister Hedwig wrote a letter to her parents describing what had happened to them under the Nazi regime. That letter, which is lost today, included details so troubling that Traugott and his brother decided not to deliver it, Michael Traugott said.

Traugott returned home in the fall of 1945.

Unearthing the Past

Traugott went on to rear three children in Providence– Michael, Mark, and Kathryn. He established his own jewelry company and later worked as a sales manager for the Colonial Knife Co.

Traugott seldom spoke to his children about his life in Germany or his time in the war. He had likely signed nondisclosure agreements during his service, his son said, and there were memories unwanted. Traugott avoided speaking German for a long period after the war and didn’t return to visit Germany for more than 25 years.

Traugott died in Palm Beach in 1995.

Lucia preserved the letters, photographs, and documents displayed in the exhibition.

It was only after her death in 2018 that their children discovered these historical sources: Over 300 letters and a few dozen photographs.

Michael initially made contact with the Wannsee Conference House with an emailed photograph of the villa with the American flag hoisted above it.

After two years of research and contact, the museum is presenting a special exhibit that centers on Traugott’s materials and experience.

History, Memory, and Extrapolation

The upcoming exhibit, which includes an audio tour in the gardens of Wannsee, brings with it a convergence of past and present, and of personal and global history that invites exploration into the legacy of perpetrators, victims, and liberators.

“Fritz Traugott’s biography, letters, and photographs provide us and our visitors with a different and new perspective on the history of the House of the Wannsee Conference,” said exhibit curator Judith Alberth. “His parents, his brother and he himself were expelled due to antisemitic persecution, and his sister, his brother-in-law, and his nieces survived the Shoah in Hamburg in desperate circumstances. Their stories add a significant perspective to the sources and biographies of perpetrators that the House is mostly linked to.”

“L’dor vador,” which translates to “from generation to generation,” is a central concept in Jewish culture, which places weighted emphasis on the passing of stories and traditions across time.

“Part of this journey recently has been a deeper recognition of this Jewish history, which we never lived, but has been brought to the forefront through the development of the exhibition,” said Michael Traugott, who had little exposure to religion aside from Catholic sacramental ceremonies growing up. “…There’s also an element of realizing opportunities that we lost to have extended conversations with our father – which he might not have wanted to participate in.”

Michael, Mark, and Kathryn Traugott

Michael, Mark, and Kathryn Traugott, retracing their father’s steps at the Wannsee House

Traugott’s descendants– who will all attend the opening of the exhibit– have used the photographs and documents to plumb their family history. In 1994, Michael Traugott also took a trip to Berlin to retrace steps his father had taken and to reproduce photos his father had taken on the same grounds, 50 years prior.

“Sifting through the valuable sources and sorting them together can reconstruct a piece of family history,” Alberth wrote of the exhibit. “Further research, which we carried out in American and German archives, can add to the puzzle – but it will always remain fragmented.”

“This project has involved memory, but also extrapolation,” said Michael Traugott. “It’s both trying to reconstruct events of the past with relative accuracy, but thinking about how behavior, events, and belief systems might be extended forward in time to other events, and other periods.”

Traugott’s story invites us to imagine what it might have been like for a refugee to return to Germany in what his son described as “a strange re-immersion.”

Museum director Deborah Hartmann writes, for example, of what it might have meant for Traugott to appropriate stationary and souvenirs from places like the Chancellery: “The men demonstrated their own personal victory over the Nazi dictatorship,” she writes.

For Hartmann, the exhibit is also an occasion to consider how we remember past events, and the impact of memory on our political actions and national and community identities.

Research on collective memory distinguishes history and memory. French scholars Jean-Francois Orianne and Francis Eustache write that “history separates the past from the present and future, whereas memory links them together. Memory always operates in the present: it is a continual rewriting of the past in the present for future use.”

The exhibit ends with a photograph of Vice President J.D. Vance, visiting the Dachau Concentration Camp on Feb. 13, 2025. The next day, at the Munich Security Conference, Vance demanded that Germany’s far-right parties, including the AfD, not be excluded in coalition governments. AfD leaders have specifically repudiated the idea that we should educate future generations about atrocities in Germany’s past, as a safeguard to our future.

“The open and critical discourse on history is a core element of free, democratic societies,” said Hartmann. “Authoritarian governments therefore see it as a threat and seek to impose only the narratives they have set as valid. This repeatedly leads to distortions in the history of the Holocaust, which we must counter. When the leader of the far-right AFD party, in a conversation with Elon Musk on X, refers to Adolf Hitler as a ‘communist,’ and Musk agrees with her, they are denying the ideological origins of the Holocaust in racist antisemitism.”

The exhibition, which will run until next summer, opens June 19, 2025, with free daily admission from 10 to 6. The museum’s registration for the opening– which can be attended live or online– is now open.

This post was written by Tevah Platt, a communicator for the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research. Michael Traugott is a research professor affiliated with the Center for Political Studies and an expert on campaigns and elections, voting behavior, and political communication.

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