Dr. Shibley Telhami—the Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland and an influential scholar on foreign affairs and American public opinion on the Middle East—presented a sweeping historical picture yesterday of how American attitudes toward Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have evolved in recent decades.
“What we’re witnessing is a paradigmatic shift that’s likely to last that sees Israel as a villain and perhaps even a genocidal villain,” Telhami said in a seminar presented to the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research. “We have something that I think is more than just a short-term shift in public opinion, and that is much deeper than people may assume.”
Telhami’s central argument, based on his work polling American attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 1989, is that Americans’ support for Israel– waning gradually over the past 15 years– experienced a dramatic crash following the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas attack and the Israeli assault on Gaza. Telhami: “The dam finally broke in Gaza once the scale of the Israeli assault became clear.”
A Paradigm Shift
Telhami emphasized that this transformation did not begin with the war in Gaza, but was building over time. Telhami’s polling data of past decades showed that a majority of Americans have consistently said they want the U.S. to take “neither side” in the conflict. Among the minority who did express a preference, support for Israel outweighed support for the Palestinians by wide margins—often five or six to one. Telhami has seen that gap close over time, with fewer Americans choosing “neither side,” and among those who do take sides, a narrowing—and eventually reversing—preference, especially among Democrats.
Under Biden, Telhami’s University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll confirmed that half of young Democrats (under 35) disapproved of the new U.S. president’s handling of the May 2021 Gaza conflict. Writing for theBrookings Institution, Telhami argued that the data underscored a generational shift that would prove to be a warning sign of a widening fracture within the Democratic coalition, and anticipated that could impact Biden’s reelection.
Telhami’s polling data showed an initial, dramatic spike in sympathy for Israel in the immediate aftermath of the October 7, 2023 attacks—the largest poll-to-poll increase he has measured in decades of surveying. But this reversed within roughly two weeks, even before the full scope of Israel’s military actions was apparent. Young Democrats did not shift in attitudes during this initial spike– and as the war intensified, their sympathies moved decisively toward the Palestinians.
Telhami used Gallup Poll data to illustrate the scale of the overall reversal: Sympathy for Israel among all Americans fell from roughly 50% to 36%, while sympathy for Palestinians rose to 41%. Among Democrats specifically, the shift was described as “stunning”—support for Israel plummeted from over 50% in 2001 to roughly 17% in recent polling, while sympathy for Palestinians rose to 65%. Republican attitudes, by contrast, remained largely stable or even slightly strengthened in favor of Israel—with one critical exception.
A Generational Gap in Both Parties
Telhami’s data show a narrowing generational gap among Democrats and growing gap among Republicans.
Pew polling cited by Telhami showed that among Democrats, the gap between younger and older cohorts on unfavorable views of Israel has nearly disappeared (71% vs. 66%). Between 2022 and 2025, younger and older Democrats turned more negative toward Israel, but negative views among younger Democrats grew by 9 percent, compared with a 23-point increase among older Democrats.
Even more notable is movement among younger Republicans: Unfavorable views of Israel in this group rose from 35% to 57% in a short span—a shift Telhami called evidence that this is “spreading to more segments of society,” not confined to the political left.
Telhami’s research on evangelicals demonstrated that younger evangelicals, unlike their elders, were “walking away” from unconditional support for Israel.
When asked whether Israel’s actions in Gaza were “justified” as self-defense, only 22% of young Republicans responding to Telhami’s poll agreed, compared to 52% of older Republicans.
Why Now? Drivers of the Shift
Telhami outlined several interlocking explanations for why this issue has moved from the margins to the center of American political consciousness:
Rising priority for those attuned to the issue: Drawing on decades-old research with colleague Jon Krosnick, Telhami explained that policy influence depends less on broad public opinion than on “issue publics”—segments who rank an issue as a top priority. Historically, this issue public was small but overwhelmingly pro-Israel. Now, younger Democrats increasingly rank Israel-Palestine as a high concern, possibly because they view it as emblematic of broader commitments to human rights and democracy.
Perceptions of genocide and American complicity: Telhami’s polling shows substantial and growing numbers of Americans—including a plurality of the general public and majorities of Democrats—describing Israel’s actions in Gaza as “genocide” or “major war crimes akin to genocide.” More than 60% of respondents said U.S. military and diplomatic support actively enabled these actions, tying the issue directly to American foreign policy rather than treating it as a distant humanitarian concern.
The Iran War as an accelerant: Telhami argued that the U.S. strike on Iran transformed the issue from a foreign policy question into what he called a “pocketbook issue,” linked tangibly to energy prices and inflation. Public discourse increasingly framed the war as one the U.S. entered on behalf of Israel and Netanyahu.
A “permission structure” for criticism: Telhami theorized that a social and psychological threshold had been crossed: Once enough people began publicly criticizing Israel, others who privately held similar views felt emboldened to speak out, having previously assumed they were in the minority. Telhami’s polling of the public and of scholars of political science has directly asked whether and why Americans have self-censored in sharing their views on Israel-Palestine. Pre-war, more than 60% of scholars reported feeling the need to self-censor when discussing Israel-Palestine professionally, with the overwhelming majority citing fear of appearing critical of Israel. That figure rose above 80% after October 7. Extending this research to the general public, Telhami found that 42% of Americans say they feel the need to be “careful” discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in public—compared to only 29% who say the same about Russia-Ukraine.
Looking Ahead: Fragility, Wild Cards, and Electoral Consequences
Telhami closed with reflections on the durability of this shift and its political stakes:
Israeli elections: While some observers hope a new Israeli government might ease American concerns, polling data suggests dissatisfaction with Israel runs deeper than opposition to Netanyahu personally.
Islamophobia as a “wild card”: Telhami highlighted dramatically rising unfavorable views of Muslims among Republicans—now at a 12-year high—which could continue to anchor pro-Israel sentiment within the GOP even as other factors erode it.
Trump and Republican fragility: Telhami argued that Republican support for Israel is more fragile than commonly assumed, and that anchoring this support in this moment is is President Trump’s personal backing of Israel. A political shift in course from the GOP might not result in major backlash from the evangelical base that supports Trump for reasons unrelated to Israel.
Electoral consequences: Telhami argued that the Israel-Palestine issue contributed to Democratic losses in 2024, including Kamala Harris’s defeat, citing both polling data and firsthand knowledge of internal campaign dynamics. He suggested the upcoming midterms will reveal how durable this electoral effect proves to be, with races like those in Texas potentially offering more revealing tests than reliably Democratic states like Michigan.
While acknowledging uncertainty about how this shift will translate into concrete policy outcomes that are never purely a function of public opinion, Telhami asserted: “Public opinion will matter more on this issue than it has in the past. I have no doubt about that.”
This post was written by Tevah Platt, who manages communications for the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research. It is based on Telhami’s presentation on Oct. 14, 2026 in the CPS Interdisciplinary Workshop on Politics and Policy.
Learn more: Telhami’s newly released 2026 Critical Issues Poll data tracks prejudice toward Jews and Muslims among the American public, and also measures change in how Americans define antisemitism and the extent to which they differentiate attitudes against Jews and Judaism from attitudes against Israel and Zionism.
On Oct. 4, over 100 million Brazilians headed to the polls to elect a president, state governors, two-thirds of the Senate, federal and state deputies and, in the Federal District, district deputies. The top two presidential candidates, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and former President Jair Bolsonaro, will go to a run-off election on Oct. 25. The new leader will take power on Jan. 5, 2027. Fernanda Pires of Michigan News sat down with University of Michigan experts Edgar Franco-Vivanco and Raphael Nishimura on the eve of the first-round election that ended in a 47-45% split between Bolsonaro and Lula. Her Q&A follow:
The election is taking shape amid divisions over President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and the political legacy of former President Jair Bolsonaro. Bolsonaro’s son, Flávio Bolsonaro, is Lula’s main rival in the presidential race. Voters’ concerns about the economy, public security, the Supreme Court crisis and the country’s future are also central to the race.
University of Michigan assistant professor of political science Edgar Franco-Vivanco, director of the Latin American Elections Hub, and Raphael Nishimura, sampling operations director at the Institute for Social Research, discuss voter sentiment, polling and the election’s potential implications for Latin America and the world.
What could Brazil’s election mean for the region and the world?
Franco-Vivanco: Latin America has shown a clear political shift to the right. Four countries in the region—Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru—have recently moved toward right-wing governments. In Brazil, voters are disappointed with previous left-leaning incumbents and increasingly frustrated by rising crime and persistent corruption scandals. As Latin America’s largest democracy, Brazil will determine whether the region’s rightward shift gains momentum or faces a major counterweight.
The election holds major stakes for domestic life and the regional balance of power. A rightward turn would leave Mexico as the only major regional democracy outside this trend.
For international powers such as the United States and China, the outcome will determine how the next government balances crucial trade relationships and foreign influence. Domestically, everyday life hinges on how the incoming administration addresses public security, economic performance and persistent corruption.
This major election in Brazil will test the strength and stability of the region’s democratic institutions. Smaller Latin American nations are closely monitoring the outcome as they consider how to align their regional policies with the region’s leading power.
Brazil must balance its primary economic relationship with China with heavy diplomatic pressure from the United States. A close final vote raises the risk of postelection conflict and increases pressure on candidates to respect democratic norms by accepting the official results.
Right-wing candidates are capitalizing on public security concerns by making crime reduction their primary focus. Meanwhile, many voters remain deeply apathetic and disappointed with democracy because candidates have failed to address these issues directly.
How do voters split across key demographics in this race?
Franco-Vivanco: Gender is a primary dividing line in voter support, according to previous research. Women have traditionally backed Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, while men have tended to support Jair Bolsonaro and right-wing parties.
Recent polling shows this gender gap narrowing as candidates’ campaigns seek to alter those trends. Meanwhile, young voters are exhibiting shifting political behavior. Unlike in previous election cycles, when young voters aligned closely with left-wing causes, current polling indicates a more divided electorate among younger voters.
What post-election challenge threatens the stability of the result?
Franco-Vivanco: The core danger is whether the losing candidate accepts the final result without conflict. A tight margin increases the likelihood of postelection disputes, particularly if Flávio Bolsonaro suffers a narrow defeat. Experts view candidates’ adherence to democratic norms as the primary test for maintaining peace after voters cast their ballots.
How do foreign trade and international relations shape the stakes of this election?
Franco-Vivanco: Foreign relations depend heavily on how the incoming leader balances major global economic powers. China remains Brazil’s primary trading partner, making strong economic ties essential to the nation’s financial stability.
At the same time, the government faces direct geopolitical pressure from the United States, which prefers a closely aligned administration in the region. Maintaining this delicate balance between Washington and Beijing presents a complex diplomatic test for any administration. Smaller Latin American nations are closely following the outcome as they consider how to align their foreign policies with regional leadership.
Now, let’s talk about polls. What insights can we expect from the final eight presidential polls scheduled for release on Saturday, the day before Brazil’s election?
Nishimura: We will have polls of various sizes and methodologies, so each will look at the same question from a different angle. We can expect some of them to disagree, but, on average, they will present a snapshot of the Brazilian electorate moments before voters go to the polls.
Do the final polls tend to provide a more accurate picture of voter intentions, or can last-minute changes still significantly affect the results?
Nishimura: While the final polls might provide a closer look at what voters are thinking as the election approaches, we should not expect them to necessarily reflect the election results. Factors such as turnout, last-minute decisions and strategic voting might alter the snapshot taken days or even hours before the election.
What should voters look for when comparing the findings of different organizations?
Nishimura: Different methodologies might lead to different results. Polling methodology involves many aspects, from sample and questionnaire design to postdata-collection statistical adjustments. One of the main drivers, however, is the mode of data collection—whether in person, by phone or online.
This will most likely account for the main differences in the results. Also, in Brazil, all publicly released election polls must be registered with the Superior Electoral Court. Anyone can consult the court’s system to review the methods used in each poll.
What are the biggest methodological challenges in accurately measuring voter intentions in Brazil’s presidential race?
Nishimura: Although voting is mandatory in Brazil, one of the main methodological challenges for pollsters is measuring turnout, especially because nonparticipation is not random and affects candidates differently. This challenge is aggravated by the fact that, as in the United States and other countries, voters tend to overreport turnout in polls.
Moreover, Brazil does not have a database—such as the voter file in the United States—that contains each voter’s turnout history and could enable pollsters to estimate likely-voter models. The lack of such a list, coupled with the country’s continental size, also makes it very difficult to collect data efficiently without relying on telephone sampling. Telephone sampling has its own problems, as fewer people answer calls because of telemarketing and scams.
Edgar Franco-Vivanco is an affiliate of the Center for Political Studies, and Raphael Nishimura is an affiliate of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research.
Editor’s note: Michael W. Traugott is professor emeritus of communication and media and of political science at the University of Michigan and is currently completing his term as interim director of the Center for Political Studies at the Institute for Social Research. A past president of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, he is co-author of The Voter’s Guide to Election Polls, out last year in its sixth edition.
The data were supplied by an entity called Meridian Strategies, which has now disappeared from the internet after indicating that its sourcing of fake data was part of a “short-term social experiment examining how purported polling information could enter and spread through the political information ecosystem without independent verification.” Further sleuthing by The Guardian identified a single individual behind the scheme. The news media were clearly wrong to describe the source as a polling organization, a company, or a pollster.
This is not the first time that fake data have appeared in a political campaign. In the 2000 presidential campaign, the Daily Kos website featured poll results from a firm by the name of Research 2000 that were completely made up. In this case, the people at Research 2000 prepared a complete press release for each “poll” that included topline results, a methodology section, and a sample questionnaire. The problem was that no interviews were conducted, and the results were fabricated.
Why do some news organizations fall for fake polls?
Communication researchers who study campaign coverage are well aware of the tendency for news media to engage in horserace coverage where the emphasis is who’s ahead or behind and how the dynamics of the race are changing over time. Polls that measure candidate preferences play right into this “game dynamic” focus; they place a premium on reporting the latest results and how things have changed since the previous measurement, especially as Election Day approaches.
Polls can contribute to an understanding of the forces at work in the electorate that explain support for candidates based on their issue positions or the success of their appeals to specific groups. But too often the media only report the results of the “trial heat” question such as “”If the presidential election were held today, would you vote for Candidate A or Candidate B?”
There is also a difference in the in-house resources a reporter might have in different types of news organizations. Large circulation newspapers with a national focus often have their own polling expert, but local news outlets don’t have such access. Print and web outlets are more likely to have in-house expertise than local television stations.
How to Evaluate New Poll Results
There are some guidelines that journalists and the public can consult and organizations they can ask for guidance. The American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) has several resources on responsible reporting on polls, as does the Poynter Institute. Journalists can also turn to local universities where there are public opinion and survey methodology experts for consultation and advice on the validity of new poll results.
The key elements are:
a transparent description of the poll’s methodology
who sponsored the research
the population studied
the sample design and size
whether the data were weighted and how
the mode of interviewing
the dates of the field work, and
a copy of the questionnaire.
For news readers: Check who conducted a poll, who paid for it, whom they interviewed, when, and how — reputable pollsters disclose all of this. Then remember that every poll carries a margin of error that is wider for subgroups like “young voters” or “independent voters,” than for the full sample of all voters, and that a poll is a snapshot rather than a forecast. Similar trends that appear across many, good polls are more trustworthy than any single, surprising number.
This post was written by Michael Traugott of the Center for Political Studies and prepared for publication by Center for Political Studies communications manager Tevah Platt.
Victor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary for sixteen years (2010-26), has conceded the election to Peter Magyar and his opposition Tisza party. This is an enormous defeat for the right-wing populist leader and his right-wing populist Fidesz party and a landslide victory for the democratic opposition.
Parliamentary Supermajority for the Opposition Provides Lever to Rebuild Democracy
By winning more than 135 seats in the 199-seat legislative body, Magyar’s Tisza party has not just secured a majority but a supermajority in the Hungarian parliament. Orbán’s Fidesz party has held a parliamentary supermajority for four consecutive terms, which he has used to rewrite the constitution to consolidate his own power and to undermine democracy and the rule of law in Hungary.
Many of the tactics he used are part of the authoritarian playbook that is by now all too familiar—eliminating checks and balances on executive authority, taking control over media outlets, and reengineering the electoral system to disadvantage the opposition. Regaining control will enable the opposition to amend the constitution, reverse many of these changes, and rebuild institutions that promote democracy and the rule of law.
Yet, the landslide victory is not only a triumph for Hungary’s democratic opposition and the country’s future trajectory; it is also a major win for Europe, the European Union (EU), Ukraine, and the US.
Hope for a Strong and United Europe
The defeat of Orbán and his nationalist agenda signals to Europe, and to Europeans, that the rise of right-wing populism is not irreversible. Although not yet the dominant trend across the continent, far-right parties such as Orbán’s Fidesz have been gaining ground in Europe since the 2000s and appeared to be building momentum. Moreover, Orbán himself has become an iconic figure among them, exemplifying the success of illiberal democracy. The sweeping electoral victory of the liberal opposition in Hungary has countered this trend and diminished Orbán’s appeal as a model for Europe’s future. Instead, he is a cautionary tale.
Second, Orban’s defeat signals that Hungarians have not rejected either Europe or European values, including liberal democracy. As many European leaders stated following the election results, there is renewed hope for a strong and united Europe.
The primary beneficiary of this reunion—at least in the short run—is Ukraine. Among the many ways in which Orbán has undermined the EU is his refusal to support either further assistance to Ukraine or stricter sanctions against Russia following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. As part of his electoral campaign, Magyar pledged to rebuild Hungary’s relationship with the EU. He made good on this promise following his victory by agreeing to unblock critical aid in the form of a 90-billion-euro ($103-billion) loan to Ukraine.
Takeaways for the US
The cautionary tale of Orbán’s defeat also suggests a prescriptive one for the United States. Both the large turnout and the substantial margins made the Tisza party’s electoral win too decisive for even Orbán to contest. But neither the size of the turnout nor the landslide victory happened overnight. Albeit weakened by Orban’s policies, Hungarian civil society continued to mobilize undaunted, and Hungarian citizens increasingly took to the streets to show Orban, his loyalists, and most importantly, their fellow citizens that they would not tolerate an autocratic takeover.
The road ahead will be difficult. Orbán not only succeeded in dismantling democratic institutions and the rule of law. He also used his unchecked authority to institute a system of crony capitalism, rewarding loyalists with control over key economic sectors and lucrative development contracts, and destroying Hungary’s economy in the process. In fact, the protests that amalgamated in the opposition’s massive victory focused on anti-corruption and pocket-book issues. So too did Magyar’s electoral campaign, signifying that this is a winning electoral strategy. The new government will have to both rebuild and restore confidence in democratic institutions and the rule of law while actively combating the corrupt practices that have fueled inflation and slowed economic recovery.
This post was written by Pauline Jones, Research Professor and Director of the University of Michigan Center for Political Studies. Pauline Jones is a Professor of Political Science and the Edie N. Goldenberg Endowed Director for the Michigan in Washington Program. She is an expert on politics in the former Soviet Union (including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia) and on assessing the impact of mass protest in authoritarian regimes. She regularly teaches PoliSci140: Introduction to Comparative Politics and recently shared her insights on US democratic decline in global perspective. Dr. Jones is currently a fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (CASBS) at Stanford University.
The 2026 midterm elections are less than a year away, and they will have a powerful influence on the future of American politics. Currently, the Republican party has a “trifecta,” meaning they control the presidency, the House, and the Senate. This suggests they should be able to be able to implement their policy agenda through concerted action.
However, their majorities are slim, and there is a very good chance that the Democrats will gain control of the House after the midterm elections. Republicans currently hold a three-seat majority in the House; if the Democrats gain the majority, there will be increased scrutiny of Trump administration activities through the hearing process, with a high probability of another impeachment of Donald Trump, even if it is unlikely to result in a conviction in the Senate.
How the Midterms Work
Every two years all 435 seats in the House, and one-third of the seats in the Senate, are up for election. Political scientists have developed two distinct models for estimating the outcome of the midterms, based upon evaluations of the current president and the quality of the candidates contesting the election. It is important to note that the participation of incumbents remains unclear in all cases; while 47 House members have indicated they plan to retire so far, for example, there is still time for others to get out. There are slightly more Republicans than Democrats in this group. There are also 11 incumbent Senators who have announced their retirement or intent to run for another office as well (PBS Newshour Analysis).
While there are 435 seats in the House, not all of them are at risk of flipping. Because of redistricting, most districts are safe for one party or the other. In fact, only 36 seats are considered competitive (typically decided by 10 percentage points or less), with half of these considered tossups (New York Times Midterm Elections House Maps). Because of mid-decade redistricting efforts in some states, there are 26 districts with new boundaries and no prior electoral history, although only 11 are considered likely to be competitive.
History Disfavors Incumbent Parties
The historical pattern in the House is that the incumbent president’s party loses seats in the midterm election. There have been 20 midterm elections in the post-World War II period, and the president’s party has lost seats in 18 of them. The exceptions were in 1998 when Bill Clinton was being impeached and 2002 after the 9/11 attacks when George W. Bush was in office. The range of losses was from 4 in 1962 in John F. Kennedy’s presidency after the Cuban missile crisis to 63 in 2010 during Barack Obama’s second term, after dissatisfaction with the economy and the debates and passage of the Affordable Care Act. In the 2018 midterm election during Donald Trump’s first term, the Republican party lost 40 seats in the House.
Forecasting
Lewis-Beck and Tien (2025) have developed a model for estimating House seat losses in a midterm election based upon the president’s net approval rating in a Gallup poll (% Approving – % Disapproving) and the change in personal disposable income from the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the previous six months. When this calculation is made in August of the election year, it provides a good estimate of the seat losses in November. Lewis-Beck and Tien made an estimate in October of last year for a seat loss of 28. Since then, Donald Trump’s approval rating has declined, and the model in February now suggests a seat loss of 49. August is still six months away, and both Trump’s approval rating and Americans’ personal disposable income could increase. But it is virtually certain that the Democrats will gain control of the House.
Michael Traugott is a political scientist who studies campaigns and elections, voting behavior, and the impact of mass media on American politics He is the interim director of the Center for Political Studies (CPS) and the author of A Voter’s Guide to the Election Polls, now in its 6th edition. CPS communications manager Tevah Platt assisted in the development of this post.
Democrats had a big night last week, sweeping key elections and winning by unexpected margins up and down the ballot. Voters showed up in high numbers for an “off” election year and sided with Democrats in the elections’ four major contests: The mayor’s race in New York City, the governors’ races in Virginia and New Jersey, and the redistricting measure Prop 50 in California.
Tyler Simko is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, and an affiliate of the Center for Political Studies at the Institute for Social Research. Simko specializes in U.S. state and local politics, political geography, and computational social science. He is applying this expertise as an elections analyst for CBS, and he shared with us about the experience of doing this work and the major takeaways from the 2025 elections.
Expert Q&A with CBS Elections Analyst Tyler Simko
The content has been lightly edited for length and clarity.
1. What were your top takeaways from the 2025 elections?
Two specific trends stick out to me.
First, this was a stronger performance for Democrats than many people expected.
The election outcomes were not especially surprising. For all four major races, the expected result going into election day happened—for example, most polls before election day saw Mamdani, Sherrill, Spanberger, and “yes” on Proposition 50 as the clear frontrunners.
However, the final margins in favor of Democrats were larger than many people expected. For example, most polls placed Mikie Sherrill as the favorite, but polling averages showed a lead of around 3-5 percentage points. The ultimate election was a blowout, with Sherrill ahead with a final margin around thirteen points. Abigail Spanberger won the governor’s race in Virginia by even more.
The second major takeaway for me was that early analysis suggests that some of the “red shift” we saw in 2024 among groups like Latinos may have reverted back toward Democrats.
For example, high-Latino communities in New Jersey saw huge reversals toward Sherrill from the way residents in those same places voted in 2024 for Harris.
Results like these suggest that some of the shifts we saw in 2024 may not be set in stone. Charles Stewart III, another election analyst on the team and a Professor at MIT, has suggested this might be evidence that 2024 was a “deviating election,” rather than a new normal, citing research originally developed at the University of Michigan in the 1960s.
2. Was there anything notable about turnout for this election?
Turnout was unusually high in nearly every race on Tuesday night. In some ways, this is surprising because 2025 is an “off” election year without presidential or congressional midterm elections.
However, this high turnout reflects just how salient politics is for many Americans right now.
For example, early voting and election day turnout in the NYC mayoral election eclipsed the last election in 2021. This continued the trend we saw in the primary, where early voting more than doubled turnout in the last primary that elected Eric Adams. Turnout in other races was high as well, like California’s Proposition 50 measure on redistricting.
Further, it’s especially interesting to see where turnout was higher compared to past elections.
Patterns in turnout changes can offer insight into where voters are particularly energized right now.
For example, I wrote for CBS that many Democratic-leaning areas in New Jersey saw huge surges in turnout (some nearly 40% higher than the last gubernatorial election in 2021). This suggests that Democrats are particularly politically motivated right now, a trend that party leaders will hope continues into next year’s midterm elections.
3. What do you do as an Election Analyst on the CBS News Data Desk?
For this past election night on November 4th, I worked in the CBS Office in New York City alongside a team of other analysts to predict and analyze the elections for NYC Mayor, NJ/VA Governor, and California’s Prop. 50 redistricting referendum.
On election night the Data Desk is focused on forecasting voter turnout and predicting election results. We analyze data like exit polls and election returns as they come in, and look for interesting patterns. As with any network, one of our primary roles is to “call” the election winners.
But beyond calling the races, we’re also actively monitoring other data beyond vote shares. For example, the NYC Board of Elections frequently updates their “check-in” turnout numbers throughout the day. We use these records to help improve our turnout forecasts, which help us identify patterns early in the night. For example, even before election night, strong early voting in New Jersey’s Democratic-leaning areas suggested it would be a good night for Mikie Sherrill.
Finally, a good deal of work happens both before and after the elections too. For example, some members of the team prepare products like the CBS Exit Polls in preparation for election day.
Similarly, after election day there is a ton of new data to analyze. For example, the morning after election day, Kabir Khanna (Director, Election Analytics & Technical Systems at CBS) and I wrote an article for CBS News demonstrating how high turnout in Democratic-leaning counties strongly favored Sherrill. We’ll continue conducting this kind of analysis in the coming weeks.
4. What are the goals of this work, and how do your expertise and skills meet the needs of delivering election results and analysis?
Predicting election results (before they happen) and analyzing returns (after they happen) require knowledge of both electoral systems and statistics. At the University of Michigan, I teach courses on American Politics and Political Methodology in the Political Science department and research topics in political institutions and computational social science, so this kind of work is right up my alley. You know, I used real data from election night for an interactive prediction activity in my graduate-level Machine Learning course this past week.
Calling election results is a classic prediction problem. You don’t have complete information before election night is over, but you would like to use statistical “signals” to make data-driven predictions about what is going to happen. Often, we use statistical models because we want to detect patterns over the course of election night that may not be clear from simply counting returns as they come in.
For example, imagine a hypothetical situation where votes for NYC Mayor from Staten Island all come in first, early on election night. A simple “counting” approach would predict Andrew Cuomo had a large lead in the mayoral election because he had strong support in Staten Island, while in reality Mamdani clearly won overall. Statistical models help account for these patterns like geographic segregation in candidate support. Training in both political science and statistics/data science helps.
5. What are the future implications of the 2025 election results?
I think this set of results has two important implications:
First, this strong Democratic win will change the political dynamics over the next year as we head into the midterms. In the meantime, these results also give national Democrats more leverage in ongoing debates like the government shutdown.
We also might see these results change political rhetoric over the next few months. For example, Mamdani’s campaign focused on affordability and we have already seen Trump adopting this language in recent interviews.
The second major signal comes from the strong passage of California’s Proposition 50. This result greenlights Democratic efforts to push back against the new Texas redistricting plan that made their existing gerrymander even more extreme.
Republicans currently have the lead in this redistricting “war” because they have aggressively gerrymandered maps in several states. But, Prop. 50 will likely embolden Democrats in states like Virginia to try gerrymandering their own favorable plans.
Some of my own research helps clarify the consequences of gerrymanders. My co-authors and I at the ALARM Project—a research group focused on political geography and public policy—have shown that gerrymandering makes congressional elections less competitive and less responsive to the will of voters. Our research also shows that these other states could learn from Michigan, as our independent redistricting commission helps ensure redistricting plans are more fair and less biased.
Tyler Simko is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, and an affiliate of the Center for Political Studies at the Institute for Social Research. This post was developed by Tyler Simko and Tevah Platt, communications manager for the Center for Political Studies.
Michael Traugott is a political scientist who studies campaigns and elections, voting behavior, and the impact of mass media on American politics He is the interim director of the Center for Political Studies (CPS) and the author of 
